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Date: April 30, 2024 Tue
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Results for opium trade
3 results foundAuthor: U.S. Department of State. Office of Inspector General Title: Status of the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs Counternarcotics Programs in Afghanistan: Performance Audit Summary: Afghanistan remains the world’s largest grower of opium poppy, the source of over 90 percent of illicit global opium. The narcotics industry continues to fuel the insurgency, undermining efforts to assure security, extend governance, and develop the legal economy in Afghanistan. The Middle East Regional Office (MERO) of the Office of Inspector General (OIG) initiated this performance audit under the authority of the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended. The objectives of this audit were to determine: (1) the Department’s counternarcotics strategy objectives and the impediments to achieving these objectives; (2) how well the Department is administering the program and monitoring contractor performance; and (3) whether the Department and the Embassy are effectively coordinating their efforts in Afghanistan with other agencies, U.S. and coalition military forces, and with Embassy Islamabad. Details: Washington, DC: United States Department of State, 2009. 63p. Source: Internet Resource; Accessed August 10, 2010 at http://oig.state.gov/documents/organization/134183.pdf Year: 2009 Country: United States URL: http://oig.state.gov/documents/organization/134183.pdf Shelf Number: 117826 Keywords: Drug ControlDrug Trafficking (Afghanistan)Opium Trade |
Author: Goodhand, Jonathan Title: Drugs and (Dis)Order: A Study of the Opium Trade, Political Settlements and State-Making in Afghanistan Summary: This paper represents one contribution to a wider research project led by the Crisis States Programme2, which examines how patterns of resource mobilisation and rent appropriation, in war to peace transitions, shape wider political relations and institutions. The research aims to test the hypothesis that particular types and patterns of rent appropriation may contribute to more inclusive/exclusive political settlements which translates into more/less stability of the state. Here we are primarily concerned with the political economy of post-Bonn Afghanistan, with a particular focus on the role of the drugs industry and its impacts upon processes of state-building and peace-building. Section one introduces our theoretical framework and background on the Afghan case. Section two gives an overview of the structural characteristics and contemporary dynamics of the drugs industry. Section three provides a comparative analysis of the linkages between drugs, the political settlement and post conflict state-building, through three provincial level studies. Section four building on the case studies and relevant literature draws out some of the underlying relationships and broader patterns connecting drugs, violence and political coalitions in Afghanistan. Section five outlines some tentative conclusions and broader theoretical and policy implications. Details: London: Crisis States Research Centre, London School of Economics, 2010. 48p. Source: Internet Resource: Crisis States Working Papers Series No. 2: Accessed November 29, 2010 at: http://www.crisisstates.com/download/wp/wpSeries2/WP83.2.pdf Year: 2010 Country: Afghanistan URL: http://www.crisisstates.com/download/wp/wpSeries2/WP83.2.pdf Shelf Number: 120305 Keywords: Drug TraffickingDrugs ( Afghanistan)Opium Trade |
Author: Mansfield, David Title: All Bets are Off! Prospects for (B)reaching Agreements and Drug Control in Helmand and Nangarhar in the run up to Transition Summary: The issue of illicit drug production has largely fallen off the policy agenda in Afghanistan. In addition to the increasing focus on the part of Afghanistan’s foreign partners on an exit strategy, this has been to a considerable extent due to a favourable trend in the short-term metrics by which the drugs issue is typically judged. Levels of opium poppy cultivation have seen a reduction from their peak of 197,000 hectares (ha) in 2007 to 123,000 ha in 2010. There has also been a steady increase in the number of provinces where cultivation is negligible and which are classified as “poppy free.” Even a slight increase in cultivation in 2011 to 131,000 ha went largely unnoticed, as did the recurrence of cultivation in the provinces of Kapisa, Baghlan, and Faryab after years of being “poppy free.” It is plausible that even the 2012 figures, and the estimated 18 percent increase in the area under cultivation, can be “handled” by emphasising the 36 percent fall in opium production between 2011 and 2012 - even if it was due to an unprecedented cold snap in March 2012. It seems that amidst the plans for transition by the International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF), concerns over the electoral process, and the cumulative impact of the war, with increases in both civilian casualties and the number of Western soldiers being killed, the uptick in cultivation continues to be of little immediate concern to Western policymakers and politicians. Drawing on in-depth fieldwork in the provinces of Helmand and Nangarhar, this report reveals that unfortunately such complacency is completely unjustified. In the simplest terms, this report reveals that cultivation in both Helmand and Nangarhar has risen in the 2011-12 growing season, raising doubt as to whether both provinces have an effective model for longterm drug control in Afghanistan. Of far greater concern are the different socioeconomic and political processes that lie behind this rise in cultivation, and what it means for both opium production and stability in the run up to transition, as well as beyond then, after Western combat operations have ceased in December 2014. The report highlights the fragility of the recent reductions in opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan. Then, through an analysis of the different factors that have led to an increase in cultivation in Helmand and Nangarhar in the 2011-12 growing season, it offers insight into how important the illegal drugs trade will to be in the political economy of a post-transition Afghanistan. In particular, the report illustrates just how closely opium poppy cultivation is entangled in the socioeconomic and political fabric of the provinces of Helmand and Nangarhar. It highlights how difficult it is to maintain the kinds of bargains that provincial governors have made with the rural elite to elicit their support to reduce opium poppy in areas where the welfare of the rural population is deteriorating and where the government does not have preponderant control over the means of violence. The report shows that it is under these very conditions that the current administration’s desire to ban opium poppy has led to “over-governing”—striving to extend its reach into physical space where it has little history of direct engagement, where the relationship between the state and the rural elite has been at its most fragile, and where past attempts to impose central rule on the population have led to violent repercussions. Ultimately, the report outlines two very different trajectories involving different populations in both provinces. One trajectory applies to populations in areas where the Afghan state has a history of effective control over the rural population, achieved through the rural elite whose interests largely align with those in state power. In these areas, resource endowments and market opportunities permit a sustained shift out of opium production, and it is in these areas that the state and its ban on poppy can prevail. The second trajectory charts a very different course. It applies to populations that have a history of armed resistance against state intervention, an egalitarian tribal system, and an internally divided, competing, and unstable rural elite that includes political adversaries who are keen to capitalise on the failures of their opponents. These are areas where livelihood opportunities are severely constrained by terrain, an effective distance from markets, and have limited resource endowments. In these areas, imposing a ban on opium production has presented the provincial and local political leadership with a significant challenge given that such bans have impoverished the rural population and compelled them to pursue coping strategies that expose them to physical risks, and have led to growing hostility toward the Afghan government and its foreign backers. It is in these areas that, in the absence of foreign military support after December 2014, if not before, the state will have little choice but to rescind its opium ban, retreat to the lowland valleys, and explore new ways to engage with the population and rural elite if it is not to find itself incre asingly besieged. The report shows that based on the evidence from Helmand and Nangarhar, rather than extending the writ of the Afghan government, as some suggest has happened, expanding bans on opium across an ever increasing geographical area, regardless of the socioeconomic and political conditions, has in fact undermined state formation, increased rural discontent, and presented new opportunities for the insurgency. This process, and the resurgence of opium poppy cultivation post-2014, will have major implications for the Afghan state and in turn implications for Western nations who plan to continue to provide development assistance and support to the Afghan state. Details: Kabul: Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, 2013. 116p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed January 31, 2013 at: http://www.areu.org.af/Uploads/EditionPdfs/1302%20Opium%2023%20Jan-Final.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Afghanistan URL: http://www.areu.org.af/Uploads/EditionPdfs/1302%20Opium%2023%20Jan-Final.pdf Shelf Number: 127466 Keywords: Drug Control (Afghanistan)Drug TraffickingOpium TradePoppy Cultivation |